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ABSTRACT: Since the 1970s, there has been strong resistance to the drive towards a 
‘reconstruction’ of Marx. The main objection is based in the premise that Marx’s core ideas 
are irreparably flawed, and thus, reconstruction is doomed, in that this work must either 
ignore or downplay political economy (making the reconstruction irrelevant or greatly 
distant to Marx, as was Habermas’ early reconstruction), or be true to Marx’s contradictory 
ideas (in which case it is not a reconstruction, but simply a reading, bound to run aground). 
Helmut Reichelt objects on these terms and demands that a radical reconstruction take place: 
rewriting Marx’s critique of political economy with and against his texts. However, the 
necessity of a radical reconstruction is challenged if one takes that position that Marx’s works, 
though flawed, are not as contradictory as they seem, and in fact Marx is whole, conflicted 
but not split, writing something fundamentally simple and coherent: human beings are free 
until their own relations become objective and overpower them, i.e., class struggle is driven 
by material contradictions that are human in origin. 
KEYWORDS: Karl Marx; Alienation; Dead labour; György Márkus; Grundrisse; Capital 
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ON THE TWO METAMORPHOSES OF HUMAN ACTIVITY IN MARX 
In the Grundrisse Marx describes the unfolding of human history (though not 
in these exact terms) as two of the metamorphoses of human activity and the 
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three phases of human existence. In the first phase of human existence, 
human beings have local/immediate relations with other human beings, and 
nothing external comes into it. In the second phase, and especially as this 
phase progresses, human relations become objective conditions of life, they are 
displaced into the environment in which human beings live and take on the 
semblance of natural conditions, i.e., a lower class no longer toils for the 
benefit of an idle upper class—a relationship between two classes of human 
beings—but we all become slaves of capital and imagine this very particular 
relationship to be unchangeable. Some toil comfortably, as personifications 
of capital; others miserably, as mere surplus-value generators; and a growing 
number exist somewhere in between, living a life in which one mistakes the 
freedom of capital for one’s own freedom. Feudalism straddles both phases, 
with the revolutionary transition into capitalism signalling in a sense the end 
of the reign of living human beings and the beginning of a period in which 
dead labour is no longer accountable to living labour: we enter the realm of 
the subjection of the living to the dead. In the third phase, the conditions of 
modern human life are de-reified, unmasked as being a) contingent, and b) 
human in origin: they are mastered, and a higher form of human-to-human 
relations is established, no longer local/immediate (a non-cosmopolitan 
communism is unthinkable before Stalin’s ‘revisions’), but again human (as 
opposed to now, a situation in which objects are social and human beings 
anti-social), only this time the human-to-human relations will be beyond 
domination and servitude.1  
Marx does not recant this model. In Capital he is still writing about an 
upside-down world in which things have personality and people do not, and 
is still motioning towards a communist world where people can be people 
and things things. And yet the wording of the model in the Grundrisse is worth 
dwelling upon, primarily because it challenges common humanist and 
 
1 An explanation as to why present exploitation would not be described by Marx as human beings 
dominating human beings is forthcoming. As a general rule, for Marx, human-to-human relations are 
peaceful, and if there is domination, it is the domination of objectified relations over people that looks 
like one person dominating another. It is not however clear cut, as the feudal lord dominates as a 
human being but also as a ‘class actor’, which is to say on the behalf of objectified human relations, 
whereas modern exploitation is more completely the subjection of all human beings to their own 
objectified relations. The more we objectify our relations, the more we become objects, until the final 
phase is reached. 
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orthodox readings. There is clearly not a definitive humanist or orthodox 
position, with as much debate occurring within the ‘schools’ as between 
them, but broadly one may say that orthodox Marxists today are those who 
think that State-based communism more or less genuinely reflected Marx’s 
works and intentions, including a belief that dialectical materialism is a 
legitimate heir to Marx’s materialist conception of history. This orthodox 
reading (or cluster of readings), which see our thoughts and actions as being 
(in the last analysis) determined, consequently downplay Marx’s goals of 
human freedom (to replace the freedom of capital that is only a false 
semblance of human freedom) and democracy (the unmediated rule of the 
associated producers), basically following Lenin, who ceased to speak of these 
after 1917.2  
Interest in these neglected Marxian concepts is taken up by humanist 
Marxism, with humanist Marxists fundamentally being those who believe 
that Marx would have been horrified by ‘really-existing socialism’, and who 
are interested in ‘liberal’ causes in the present. This reading (or cluster of 
readings), frequently downplays Marx’s deep mistrust of rights discourses 
and his ambivalence towards real liberal- and social-democratic movements 
(Marx still believed that revolution was the one and only answer to the 
problem of capitalism until the mid-1860s, when he became active in the 
International Working Men’s Association in London).3 Such readings (see 
for example almost any article in News and Letters) also frequently hold tight to 
an ungrounded conviction that Marx was interested in equality,4 seemingly 
 
2 Alain Badiou, student of Louis Althusser, is a good example of what an orthodox reading looks like 
today, and even he, though he objects sharply to any comparison of Stalin and Hitler, and fetishizes 
Mao, is ‘humanist’ to the extent that he believes that the Party must be the people in more than name. 
3 Stedman-Jones, Gareth, Karl Marx: Greatness and Illusion, USA: Penguin Books, 2016, p. 498. 
4 This maxim, unsubstantiated yet ubiquitous, is grounded in the old (highly confused) conservative 
idea that freedom and equality are mutually exclusive entities, and that there was more equality but less 
freedom in the USSR, whereas in the USA there was more freedom but less equality (a very strange 
idea, in that the USSR was the land of the gulag and the USA the land in which human beings would 
fight to the death for the right to have markets dictate every element of human life). The usual 
position, that Marx loves equality and hates freedom, is immensely problematic. Marx does indeed 
despise what capitalism calls freedom, but only because it is not truly free (it is objects becoming 
subjects and subjects becoming objects, which is the opposite of freedom). But he also despises what 
‘Marxists’ generally call equality, and rarely discusses it without complete contempt. Today, with the 
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unaware of Marx’s savage critiques of ‘crude communists’ and ‘religious 
ascetics’.5 In a rant in The Communist Manifesto Marx describes many of his 
humanist followers today in a list of the kinds of people who he despises, 
including vegetarians and those interested in charity.6 In short, a passion for 
equality is Christian, not Marxist, something that ‘Western Marxism’, the first 
‘humanist Marxism’, used to understand well.7 New humanist readings, as 
worthy as they are, frequently miss that Marx’s emphasis was never on 
inequality (he sees interest in equality as something objectionable and base, 
‘universal envy’ dressed up as justice), but was rather fixed firmly on freeing 
the living from the cold clutches of the dead. The humanist move in the end 
commonly takes us as far from Marx ‘the man’ as does the orthodox 
opposing move of ignoring Marx’s interest in freedom and claiming that all 
are equal as long as ‘their Party’ is in charge. 
The orthodox/humanist split should be treated with suspicion in general, 
based as it is in the mistaken idea that there is a contradiction within Marx 
between two competing concepts: 1) we are free (class struggle), and 2) we are 
 
help of Nietzsche and the mature Adorno, we may call this concept of equality ‘liberal’, and view it 
with mistrust as the ‘slave morality’ or an egalitarian mutation of the ‘authoritarian personality’ 
(Habermas called it ‘left fascism’), in line with Marx’s own distaste for such attitudes. Though one must 
tread carefully here, for there is a kind of equality that Marx did champion, one that is the sin qua non 
of freedom. Marx hated the word equality too much to call it thus, but it is a species of equality, and 
simply means that all human beings are free from ‘mundane considerations’: i.e., food, shelter, and 
medicine are provided automatically for all. Unlike the ‘slave morality’ or the ‘authoritarian 
personality’ version of this, the motivation is not the destruction of strength and culture and the 
protection of the weak: Marx called this Christian ascetism with a Socialist tinge and decried it as 
levelling, and this critique holds even more today. The motivation for Marx is that freedom, the 
freedom to be an end-in-itself, begins only where necessity ceases. One gives everybody what they 
need (and this is true equality) so that they do not have to think about survival: here, truly human 
existence begins, not in everybody obsessing over the comfort of the weak but in everybody having the 
material basis to grow their own strength. This may sound overly aristocratic for a characterisation of 
Marx, but Marx is also not ‘liberal’ in the opposite sense, the ‘master morality’ sense of believing in 
freedom qua ‘self-reliance’, this only ever being false freedom, the freedom of capital to feast on human 
beings who are vulnerable because they ‘owe nothing’ to one another, being ‘mutually indifferent’. 
Freedom for Marx is anti-liberal: it cannot exist for any ‘private individual’, but only for a community 
with a deep comprehension of extreme mutual interdependence.  
5 Marx, Karl, Economic and philosophic manuscripts of 1844, Russia: Progress Publishers, 1977, p. 95; 
Marx, Karl & Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto, USA: Haymarket Books, 2005, p. 74. 
6 Marx & Engels, The Communist Manifesto, pp. 80–81. 
7 Fromm, Erich, Marx’s Concept of Man, USA: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1972, p. 39. 
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determined (historical materialism). It is agreed that logically these concepts 
cancel each other out, and subsequently one chooses the idea that one likes 
better and hypostatises it into a person that one then calls Marx. There is 
thus a Marx for those who support the orthodox position, a ‘mature 
scientist’, and a Marx for those who support the ‘liberal’ position, a ‘young 
humanist’. Both are when incautious spurious readings, misinformed about 
being a ‘return to Marx’, and both are in essence the same misreading, in so 
far as the vulgar humanist agrees with the orthodoxy, that Marx is split, but 
chooses the rejected Marx and calls the materialist scientist abject. Following 
György Márkus, this paper puts forward a continuity thesis between 
humanism and anti-humanism (i.e., it accepts that Marx changes in the 
1840s and moves away from humanism, but rejects the thesis that he 
becomes ‘other’ to himself, a ‘structuralist’). 
There is no actual contradiction within Marx’s works, and the pieces 
deemed to be so alien to one another in fact fit easily together.8 In short, 
Marx understands history as being driven by human activity that is free and 
constrained (living labour is free but also in conflict with/subordinated by dead 
or objectified labour). If one insists that Marx’s works are heterogenous, either 
about one thing (freedom and philosophy), or another (law and science), 
each of which contradicts the other, and that one must subsequently choose 
between two Marxes: a young philosopher of autonomy and struggle and an 
old scientist of impersonal processes that carry us along, one potentially 
deprives oneself of Marx’s actual body of work, which (though not entirely 
homogeneous) contains a rich, rewarding, and ultimately coherent 
emancipatory explanation of how history unfolds. 
There are of course critiques of this drive to reconstruction. Ingo Elbe 
quotes Helmut Reichelt on the failure of various reconstruction efforts prior 
to the establishment of the Neue Marx-Lektüre. ‘No longer must one contrast 
Marx with Marxism and reconstruct an authentic Marxian theory. Rather, 
Marx’s critique of political economy itself demonstrates irreparable 
 
8 Márkus, György, Marxism and anthropology: The concept of ‘human essence’ in the philosophy of 
Marx, Netherlands: Van Gorkum, 1978, pp. 1–2. 
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“discrepancies and flaws already in the core theoretical arguments” ’.9 In 
short, Marx’s works are posited to have been defective before they were 
distorted, and thus it is put forward that it is not enough anymore to a) say that 
Stalin was an ‘Engelsist’ and not a Marxist, and then return to an untainted 
Marx, or b) make Habermas’ move, in which one builds a Marxism that 
does not impede its own aims, free to ignore as much actual content as one 
pleases (especially economic content thought to contribute to totalitarian 
readings) in pursuit of the spirit of Marx. However, the indisputable 
‘discrepancies and flaws’ in Marx’s works are not irreparable, and though this 
paper concurs with Reichelt’s critiques of standard readings, orthodox and 
humanist, and agrees that one should not abandon Marx to save him, as 
Habermas (‘the last Marxist’) does, it does not agree that one needs to 
radically reconstruct Marx (and especially not in such a manner that value 
becomes ‘a thing of thought’).10 And thus, this paper will put forward one 
more argument for a more standard reconstruction: or perhaps it would be 
better to say in this case re-membering. 
This move is also not necessary. Nick Dyer-Witheford discusses ‘a diagonal 
move out of this impasse’ (in which one prominent element of Marx is 
supposed to directly contradict another), that prefers to make the 
contradictions generate energy rather than solving them, as for example 
when Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari bring early Marxist themes such as 
‘species being’ into staunchly anti-humanist conceptualisations of Marx.11 
However, when one splits Marx or brings together the broken pieces while 
leaving them fragmented, there is a tendency to be able to read Marx 
without noting or caring about his key concern: as above, that the past 
dominates the present, objectified labour dominates living labour, the 
producer kneels before the product. 
The primary passage from the Grundrisse that this paper will interpret 
follows:  
 
9 Elbe, Ingo, ‘Helmut Reichelt and the New Reading of Marx’, The SAGE Handbook of Frankfurt 
School Critical Theory, California, New Delhi, Singapore: SAGE, 2018, p. 376. 
10 Elbe, ‘Helmut Reichelt and the New Reading of Marx’, p. 368. 
11 Dyer-Witheford, Nick, ‘1844/2004/2044: The Return of Species-Being’ Historical Materialism, 
Volume 12:4, 2004, p. 5. 
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Relations of personal dependence (entirely spontaneous at the outset) are the 
first social forms, in which human productive capacity develops only to a 
slight extent and at isolated points. Personal independence founded on objective 
[sachlicher] dependence is the second great form, in which a system of general 
social metabolism, of universal relations, of all-round wants and universal 
capacities is formed for the first time. Free individuality, based on the 
universal development of individuals and on their subordination of their 
communal, social productivity as their social wealth, is the third stage. The 
second stage creates the conditions for the third.12 
 
 
PART 1: THE TWO METAMORPHOSES AND THE THREE PHASES OF 
HUMAN EXISTENCE 
In the first phase of human existence, human beings engage in immediate, 
spontaneous, personal, transparently social relations of personal dependence: 
blood ties and relations of direct mastery and subordination.13 Human beings 
appear to be full and developed in this phase, compared to us, we who have 
been flattened and fragmented by the modern division of labour, but are in 
fact, for Marx, trapped in fixed roles determined by the level of development 
of the means of production—these pre-modern, pre-industrial beings are 
immature, and the semblance of full humanity is false.14 At a certain point, the 
first metamorphosis of human activity begins, bringing about the second 
phase of human existence.  
Here, human social bonds have become objective, alien, autonomous, and 
independent.15 Reciprocal dependency—no one person knows how to make 
a whole object anymore, as all subsistence means are produced piecemeal 
and purchased for money—increases in this phase as direct social bonds between 
‘individuals’ weaken and each and all become indifferent to the other: here, 
 
12 Marx, Karl, Grundrisse: Foundations of the critique of political economy, UK: Pelican Marx 
Library, 1973, p. 158. 
13 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 161. 
14 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 162. 
15 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 162. 
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personal independence, ‘universal relations’, and ‘all-round wants and universal 
capacities’,16 all come into being as the germ or precondition of true 
humanity. Human relations have not ceased, but have undergone a 
metamorphosis, they have been displaced, they have become objective, and are 
now enacted by things in a sphere that stands opposite thingified and 
disconnected human beings.17 Human beings appear to be free in this second 
phase, and direct, personal domination is minimised, but human beings are 
still ruled by their abstracted relations, which have become social conditions of  
existence with the semblance of natural conditions of  existence.18 Now, ‘individuals 
are ruled by abstractions, whereas earlier they depended on one another’.19 
As Marx was fond of writing: a serf knew when he was slaving for a 
master and when he was working for his own subsistence, his exploitation—
his personal exploitation, by a human being—was understood, felt, and 
justified by the mores of the social system, and it was felt, just as strongly, 
when one was working for oneself.20 The Corvée especially made this clear 
to everybody involved, for one did work for oneself and one’s family at 
home, and work for the lord on his property or another place that he 
designated, and one could at least imagine a life in which the exploitation, 
which sat on top of one’s normal working life, faded away. But today, 
exploitation appears as an indispensable part of the labour process itself—it 
has been screamed by capitalists for hundreds of years that giving workers 
rights—for example, in the nineteenth century, to enough air to live, time to 
sleep, regular meal breaks, a full consignment of fingers, to enjoy childhood 
if one is a child—will be the end of industry: today it is often asserted that 
rights make us ‘uncompetitive’ on the world market and should be avoided. 
After so many years of victorious capitalism we cannot imagine work except 
as something awful but necessary, and we have no sense at all of when we 
are being exploited and when we are not: in short, labour has been 
 
16 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 158. 
17 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 162. 
18 Marx, Grundrisse, pp. 163–164. 
19 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 164. 
20 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 346. 
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homogenised, and as a whole made into something ill, as something we do to 
‘get a living wage’, and as something that we will avoid at all costs if possible. 
If one makes one’s own shoes or has a vegetable patch, one is not labouring, in 
today’s understanding: one has rather ‘dropped out’ of the ‘labour market’, 
has escaped the necessity of ‘having a job’. That such thoughts are thinkable 
shows just how little we understand today regarding what exactly labour is. 
And Marx of course believed that labour was necessary, but, and this is an 
important distinction, Marx did not believe that labour had to be a hated 
activity, a means to life, performed under duress for no or little reward. 
Labour becomes, in communism, ‘life’s prime want’.21 But much has to 
change before that can occur. First and foremost, we need to master our 
tools, so that labour becomes a controlled process of value amassment for 
human benefit, and stops being what it is today, an uncontrolled process of 
value amassment for its own sake. One misreads Marx (as already intimated 
above) if one reads him as being upset by how ‘unfair’ or ‘unequal’ 
capitalism is. Marx is, to be clear, outraged that the ‘organisation’ of the 
process of value creation is left in ‘invisible hands’, hands that take more 
than the tangible hands of kings and lords ever could.22 He is upset, as will 
be explained, that we have traded in partial servitude to living kings and 
lords for a more insidious enslavement to ‘dead presidents’. 
To return more immediately to the idea of the phases of human 
existence, where once, in the first, spontaneous forms of human existence, 
one human being dominated another, now, in the second, all human beings 
are dominated by human activity that has taken on a material life of its own, 
and in this incarnation, congealed and inscrutable, old human activity, much 
more than the sum of its parts—and much greater than us, the living—turns 
work into what it is: robbery, the dead thieving life from the living. We are 
 
21 Marx, Karl, ‘The critique of the Gotha Program’, Marx and Engels: Basic writings on politics and 
philosophy, UK: William Collins Sons & Co., 1969, p. 160. 
22 The Party taking control back from capital is not an improvement. That Lenin said that the Party is 
the people did not make this so. Only when the associated producers take over does anything change, 
for only then do the living begin to work freely toward their own betterment, finally making their own 
history under conditions of their choosing, unbothered by the dead. Lenin, in the end opposing what 
he called ‘syndicalism’ (i.e., associated producers taking over production), was as distant to Marx as 
Stalin or any other dictator before or since.   
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no longer ‘trapped in roles’,23 because the form of the means of production 
has moved on, and can no longer abide living labour being tied or fixed in any 
manner—nothing but ‘formally free labour’ will do for it, which requires 
that no human being ‘own’ another—but we are not free, because production is 
organised around the freedom/liberty of capital, which is only mistakenly 
identified with our own, and the goal of capital, its ever increasing self-
valorisation, becomes the primary organising principle of our lives. 
Although, this is not all bad, as Marx writes, because this great period of 
unfreedom, of human subjection to metamorphosed human activity—the 
second phase of human existence—is the germination chamber of the third 
phase: freedom.24  
In this final phase of human existence, human activity must go through a 
final transformation. Human relations, which have thrived outside of their 
original context, have become through the second metamorphosis the 
material conditions through which human beings in actuality can embody the 
fullness that early humanity appeared to enjoy before the first metamorphosis 
and the freedom that modernity appears to have attained after this first 
metamorphosis—the freedom that cannot in actuality exist—the freedom of 
living labour from the invisible tyranny of dead labour—before the second 
metamorphosis releases us. We are today no longer trapped in our social 
relations because they now enjoy an objective, independent, alien existence, 
opposite us: things have lives and we do not. For Marx, this unfreedom that 
calls itself freedom is really an opportunity for freedom. It may seem dire 
that the living slave their lives away in the service of the fattening of the 
dead, and it is. But for Marx, this intensification of subjection is a genuine 
opportunity for human emancipation, as our relations are only masterable 
when they exist outside of us. The concept of alienation is thus the key to 
human freedom, and is certainly not an unimportant folly of the young 
Marx. Marx never stops thinking about alienation and his clearest 
elucidations on the topic appear in his mature writings. Take, for example, 
Capital—‘the value-relation of the products of labour ... is nothing but the 
 
23 Marx, Grundrisse, pp. 163–164. 
24 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 158. 
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definite social relation between men themselves which assumes here, for 
them, the fantastic form of a relation between things’.25 The reason that this 
paper will propose for the denial of the importance of alienation—and even 
that it exists—in Marx’s later works is that ‘Marxism’ became an alienated 
mode of thinking, and Marx himself became a danger to it. 
We are still in the second phase of human existence: we still cannot see 
that much of what looks solid in our world is in fact 
objectified/metamorphosed human activity, and since Engels and Karl 
Kautsky, ‘Marxism’ has ceased to be a suitable means for overcoming 
alienation. The reason is clear: it has been forgotten that the essence of the 
materialist conception of history is to understand that much of what looks 
natural is in fact social, and amenable to human influence. Dialectical 
materialism unlearns this lesson, and makes the laws of history into natural 
laws. It creates, in Albrecht Wellmer’s words, a scenario of: ‘a naturalization 
of history instead of a historicization of nature’.26 As the materialist 
conception of history is ‘improved’ and ‘refined’, alienation must appear 
more and more to be a strange and ‘unscientific’ element of Marx’s work: 
something unimportant and idiosyncratic. Later on in the twentieth century, 
the artifice of the ‘young Marx’ was created as a dustbin into which one 
crams alienation in order to stop this idea from destroying ‘Marxism’ (and 
the Soviets did so before Louis Althusser, in the 1930s).  
This paper does not deny that Marx changes. With Márkus I recognise 
various alterations, from the excision of the highly ambiguous theory of the 
superman in the 1840s, to the development of a theory of reification that is 
distinct from his concept of alienation in the 1860s, to a general tendency to 
think less about individuals and more about processes as he ages.27 What does 
not change, however, is that alienation remains of key importance to Marx: 
that we are objects of history when we ought to be subjects of history, i.e., we 
are ruled by our products, which means that we are estranged from ourselves 
 
25 Marx, Karl, Capital Volume I: A critique of political economy, UK: Penguin, 1982, pp. 165; passim. 
26 Wellmer, Albrecht, ‘Communications and emancipation: Reflections on the linguistic turn in 
critical theory’, On Critical Theory, UK: Heinmann, 1977, p. 235. 
27 Márkus, ‘Four forms of critical theory: Some theses on Marx’s development’, Thesis Eleven, vol. 1, 
1980; ‘Alienation and Reification in Marx and Lukács’, Thesis Eleven, vol. 5/6, 1982. 
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(my actions, will, knowledge, strength, sociability and abilities exist outside of 
me, as ‘things’) and dominated by ourselves (my congealed, 
external/objective activity uses me as a means: a source of surplus-value).28 
There is not a single text post-1844 in which this attitude cannot be clearly 
seen, though with Isaak Rubin29 (and Márkus), this paper sees the later 
formulations as being more focused. 
The essence of being alienated is to believe that the laws that bind us 
(which are us, in Marx’s understanding) have nothing to do with us and 
cannot be changed by us—and thus our future cannot be freely chosen by 
us. Marx’s message was always that we can become free, if we come to 
realise that the conditions of our unfreedom are our own actions in an 
objective form. The young György Lukács discovered how deeply this 
alienation had become entrenched within Marxism early in the twentieth 
century when he began to write about alienation as it is defined here qua 
‘reification’. The response is well documented. ‘If we get a few more of these 
professors spinning out their Marxist theories, we shall be lost. We cannot 
tolerate such theoretical revisionism of this kind in our Communist 
International’.30 The message was clear: in ‘Marxism’, the laws of history 
have nothing to do with us or our activity. This Engelsism was declared to be 
Marxism in the USSR, and unfortunately much of the world still teaches 
Marx as if this misreading was correct. 
For Marx, laws of history are not like the laws of gravity or magnetism. 
History unfolds because human relations are capable of escaping their local 
context, are capable of being transformed into the material backdrop of our 
inhuman relations, are capable of robbing us of will and volition, and 
becoming our master—the position that Leninism-Marxism and post-
structuralist Marxism sees as being not a phase, but rather, as being eternal. 
Communism is not about studying these laws as things apart and seeing what 
 
28 The reference to the ‘superman’ refers to this, that Marx initially believes that all of the elements of 
myself external to myself can be brought into me. This is of course a utopian notion, and Marx softens 
this to a position in which it is fine for my activity to exist outside of me and to surpass me, as long as it 
does not govern me. 
29 Rubin, Isaak, Essays on Marx’s theory of value, USA: Black Rose Books, 1990. 
30 Korsch, Karl, Marxism and Philosophy, USA: Monthly Review Press, 2008, p. 16. 
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is possible within them, as today we study how far we can bend the laws of 
gravity. Communism is about seeing the laws that guide our history as being 
abstracted or objectified human relations, and consciously moving into the 
third phase, ‘free individuality’.31  
PART 2: HUMAN ACTIVITY QUA PERSONAL RELATIONS 
The personal relations of reciprocal dependence of the past were a) more 
human/personal than our own are, and were b) less human/personal than they 
appeared to be. For Marx, eventually capital ‘explodes’ these personal, 
social, spontaneous human relations and supplants them, becoming the 
social bond that we carry in our pocket,32 increasing our personal 
independence. The problem is that capital does not give this gift freely: as it 
increases our personal independence it also a) begins to live our lives for us, 
outside of us, and b) takes (a varying level of) control of human lives, 
directing our daily activity and the destiny of the species. One may object 
here that there are still powerful human beings exerting control over human 
lives, but this is primarily for Marx an illusion.33 Any relation of domination 
 
31 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 158. 
32 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 157. 
33 Marx, Karl & Friedrich Engels, The Holy Family: or, critique of critical critique, Russia: Foreign 
Languages Publishing House, 1956, p. 51. ‘The propertied class and the class of the proletariat present 
the same human self-alienation. But the former class finds in this self-alienation its confirmation and its 
good, its own power; it has in it a semblance of human existence.’ This is the element of alienation that 
Ollman focuses on. On this element, there are two caveats. Firstly, there are exceptions. If I dominate 
you out of sadism, for example, capital has nothing to do with it. Marx is talking about something 
specific here, about people—good or bad, it does not matter: Marx notes in Capital pp. 351–352, that 
Quakers are no less vicious than anybody else as soon as they become capitalists—who make others 
suffer for the sake of profit. They must do it to ‘survive’, and ‘surviving’ eventually provides material 
rewards. But they are not human for Marx, and do not dominate as (living) human beings. Marx says 
more than once that capitalists are capital personified, Capital, pp. 254; 298; 342; 423; 424; 739; 989; 
991; & 1015, which means that when your employer dominates you, you are being dominated by the 
walking dead. Marx is optimistic about (living) human beings on the whole being kind to one another 
after they stop exploiting each other at the behest of the dead. ‘If citizens could not achieve their own 
private good without achieving the general good, there would be no vicious people except fools.’ Marx 
& Engels, The Holy Family, p. 178. The second caveat is that I am talking about ‘modernity’, where 
capital is (in the final analysis) in charge. Not all nations and peoples have entered ‘modernity’ to the 
same extent (if one posits that there is only one modernity). The less ‘modernised’ one is, the more 
likely it will be that human beings will be dominated by human beings and not by objective relations.  
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between two human beings is no longer a relation of human-human 
domination, but is rather two beings being subordinated to capital, one by 
being its mouthpiece/personification—capital cannot in actuality rule us 
without the use of agents—the other by being reduced to bare life, a bearer 
of labour power, turned into a thing that produces value, and more 
importantly for capital, surplus-value, all day long. As Marx writes later, in 
Capital, the whole of the life of the worker is confiscated, in order that the 
period in which he creates surplus-value can be immoderately extended.34 
She is a slave to capital, but the capitalist is a slave too, exploiting not for 
himself, but for his own master, capital. However, before this second phase 
of ‘objection domination’ there is a first phase, in which a human being 
could still dominate on his own behalf, within what Marx calls the first social 
forms, relations of personal dependence. 
Direct or personal relations in the past were more human than our 
own—a person could still be a master to some extent in his or her own right—
but less human than they appeared to be. Marx is in no way advocating a 
return to old forms of spontaneous dependence. 
In earlier stages of development the single individual seems to be developed 
more fully, because he has not yet worked out his relationships in their 
fullness, or erected them as independent social powers and relations opposite 
himself. It is ... ridiculous to year for a return to that original fullness ...35 
These relations, ‘a merely local connection resting of blood ties, or on 
primeval natural or master servant relations’,36 are thus limited. Marx does 
not once write of the personal nature of these relations without stating the 
caveat that they only seem personal. He does however also make it clear that 
these relations, these first social forms, are still—despite severe limitations—
more personal and human than our own. In earlier stages human relations 
have not yet been divorced from human beings, they have not 
metamorphosed into a ‘real-social life process’, and thus the following can be 
said about them, that a) human beings are not yet fully human, as they are 
‘imprisoned within a certain definition, as a feudal lord and vassal, landlord 
 
34 Marx, Capital, p. 544. 
35 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 162. 
36 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 161. 
 LACHLAN ROSS 131 
and serf, etc.’,37 but that b) these relations are still more personal than our 
own, because it is still human beings living human social life, not things, and 
thus human beings still here relate and enter into observable social relations: 
they can still interact in ways not reduced to buying and selling, which, as 
Marx does not tire of pointing out, is a social relation between things that 
drags mutually indifferent human beings behind it, into insipid, uninterested, 
impersonal contact. As Marx writes: ‘the objective relation on which they 
[human beings in the earlier forms] founder has still a limited, primitive 
character and therefore seems personal, while, in the modern world, personal 
relations flow purely out of relations of production and exchange’.38 Thus, 
though relations are to some extent objectified, they have not yet lifted off 
and flown away, become ‘sufficient unto themselves’.39 People are still 
personally dependent on other people, and are ruled by them. Human affairs 
are still human, although, as Marx stresses, they are not yet actually personal, 
as they will be in communism, and cannot be for as long as people are 
imprisoned in the social roles in which they live, which are, at bottom, 
determined by the level of the development of the means of production.  
PART 3: THE DISPLACEMENT/METAMORPHOSIS OF 
HUMAN/PERSONAL RELATIONS 
In the money relation, in the developed system of exchange (and this 
semblance seduces the democrats), the ties of personal dependence, of 
distinctions of blood, education, etc., are in fact exploded, ripped up (at least, 
personal ties all appear as personal relations); and individuals seem independent 
(this is an independence which is at bottom merely an illusion, and it is more 
correctly called indifference), free to collide with one another and to engage in 
exchange within this freedom; but they appear thus only for someone who 
abstracts from the conditions, the conditions of  existence within which these 
individuals enter into contact (and these conditions, in turn, are independent 
of the individuals and, although created by society, appear as if they were 
 
37 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 163. 
38 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 165. 
39 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 165. 
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natural conditions, not controllable by individuals).40 
It is pertinent to now study how human activity and roles become a) 
things living social lives, and b) actual conditions external to and facing 
human beings as something alien and autonomous. Marx is very clear about 
this: that the personal independence enjoyed by modern human beings is 
flawed thrice, in that it is a) in actually mutual indifference, b) is rooted in 
increased objective dependence, and c) there is less and not more will 
attributable to human beings. Marx is very clear about how the freedom in 
this phase is not in actuality increased, though it appears to be.41 Human 
beings are not free for self-determination, for they are not living human lives, 
but are things, discrete things that are servants of interconnected/interrelating 
objects that contain our alienated humanity and our alienated sociability, 
and thus, human beings are not free from domination. The weak rule of 
people over people based on strength, personal charisma, and other tenuous 
forms of authority, has been turned into the more insidious shackle of the 
rule of things and abstractions over human beings. 
 As for how social roles and relations become erected opposite human 
beings, the matter is fairly simple. Labour is always the objectification of 
human activity: this is the basis of the labour theory of value.  However, 
regarding the first social forms of labour, ‘human productive capacity 
develops only to a slight extent and at isolated points’.42 The magnitude of 
labour that can be objectified in these systems is thus limited by the 
undeveloped nature of the means of production: all the dead labour already 
objectified. The tools that we use, in other words, in the lower forms a) can 
only help human beings objectify a limited magnitude of fresh activity, and 
thus b) the magnitude of human activity absorbed into the external 
environment cannot reach the required level where human activity itself 
actually becomes sensuous and objective, and where capital, dead labour, 
begins to organise human activity, living labour, to the benefit of its own 
ends. 
 
40 Marx, Grundrisse, pp. 163–164. 
41 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 164. 
42 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 158. 
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In the form of production that we call capitalist, we labour under the 
tutelage (not the control) of capital, at first to a small extent, and then 
unequivocally. Capital begins tentatively by making alterations to historical 
labour processes in order to make them produce more surplus-value, as it did 
in the age of manufacture, in its hunger for absolute surplus-value, and ends 
by revolutionising production to such an extent that it no longer takes into 
account the form of  the human being and what it is capable of as an entity, 
physically and mentally, as it did in the period of large-scale industry with 
the advent of machines, in its new hunger for relative surplus-value. In the 
end the human being, his skill, his arms and legs, his art and mind, is purged 
from the idea of production, and production becomes a process in and of 
itself, able to develop exponentially.43 Marx later calls this the real 
subsumption of labour under capital.44  Once this has occurred—it does not 
happen all at once, of course, but bit by bit—the human being is no longer 
the centre of the production process—although, as Marx is very clear, 
machines do not and cannot create value, and human beings remain the secret 
source of all profit in production—and now each human being in the altered 
labour process faces his own objectified activity as an alien object, and does 
not see it as his own congealed activity, just as he does not see the machines 
and raw materials around him as the objectified activity of yet other human 
beings. What the modern worker sees is an object that has value, some 
magnitude of exchange value, but for the alienated worker, this value is a 
property of the object unrelated to his own activity, its value is just there, it is a 
property of the thing like its mass.45 Likewise, the manner in which objects 
relate, in a market, is seen to be natural, things have relations that exist 
outside of the willing and thinking and human beings, and we just take this 
for granted, without understanding that such relations have no part in 
‘nature’, i.e., that the things are engaging in displaced human relations. We do 
not understand that the entire environment around us is alive with human 
relations, human relations that have slipped free and have actually become 
 
43 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 505. 
44 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 645. 
45 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 160. 
 COSMOS AND HISTORY 134 
alien and objective—those who want to invent ‘artificial intelligence’ are too 
late, it is already done, and it already is in control.46 
In the more famous formulation of Capital: ‘Hence the rule of the 
capitalist over the worker is the rule of things over man, of dead labour over 
the living, of the product over the producer’.47 Dead labour, having become 
a system in its own right, converts human beings into two classes of beings: 
the capitalists are zombies, because they are capital personified, they are 
shells animated not by a soul, but by the dead; and living labour that 
becomes just that, beings reduced to their ability to have—without even their 
knowledge—value sucked from them, and forced to do so in order to be 
given enough to live, so that they can keep having value sucked from them.48  
In short, large-scale industry in two ways facilitates or culminates the 
process in which human activity undergoes a metamorphosis and becomes 
an independent world (it is still in actually connected to us: but enjoys de facto 
independence until alienation is overcome): 1) the human being has her 
ability to objectify her own activity greatly enhanced; and 2) the specific form 
of this exponential enhancement very efficiently hides the fact that the 
labour process is about human beings objectifying their own activity; the 
 
46 Though of course not unequivocally. If one imagines that these forces have complete control, then 
one has slipped into the anti-humanist/determinist position, drifting away from Marx in imagining the 
forces that rule us as being greater than they are. For Marx, and this is rarely discussed: only those 
who are capital personified have no hope of breaking free of being determined (Marx does not bother 
to address them directly). Those who are abused by capital are ready to break free and begin to live 
and self-determine (and the emancipation will be ‘universal’—by which Marx means everybody who 
survives the revolution will be free). As in Hegel’s dialectic of recognition, the ‘slave’ is better situated 
than the ‘master’.   
47 Marx, Capital, p. 990. 
48 This is of course a tension in Marx’s writings, in that capital is on the one hand maiming and 
diminishing us, and on the other making us ready for freedom. It is however a tension, and not a 
paradox. Nietzsche had the same idea in relation to Christianity, that it made us worse and better 
simultaneously, and that it could be good for us, as long as we broke free at the right time (i.e., before 
we are ground down completely). As Marx said in 1847: ‘the very moment civilisation begins, 
production begins to be founded on the antagonism of orders, estates, classes, and finally on the 
antagonism of accumulated labour and immediate labour. No antagonism, no progress.’ Stedman-
Jones, Karl Marx: Greatness and Illusion, p. 230. The fight between the living and the dead has benefited 
both, however, we have now reached a point where capitalism qua the rule of accumulated labour over 
living labour is no longer a positive agonistic relationship. We must either end the fight now, and 
vindicate all past suffering, or let it go on, and make it (and ourselves) worthless. 
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machines, the constant capital, which are impotent without variable capital, 
appear to do everything, when in fact all they are doing is slowly releasing a 
portion of the value that was put into them in an earlier labour process, 
value that cannot be preserved and transferred except by living human 
beings, who create fresh value as they preserve and transfer the stored value. 
The two hundred years of the age of the great manufactories is the 
prehistory of this final phase in which objectified labour takes almost 
complete control of living labour. Marx imagined that large-scale industry 
was the pinnacle of this relation: the domination of the human being by its 
product would be maximised and then overcome.      
However, this did not occur, and we still live in this second phase, though 
we are post-industrial. In any given two-party system, both parties say that 
jobs and growth are what matters: which just means that as many people as 
possible should be in a position to alienate their labour-power so that it can 
self-augment. True capitalists still greedily despair over money being spent 
on education and hospitals: people should be just educated enough to be 
able to work, and just healthy enough to be able to work, and any more than 
that is a waste. More sophisticated capitalists understand that fit and 
educated workers can help the system—negatively, they fight it less, and 
positively, they are eager to please, and have energies and abilities to do so to 
an extent that no amount of whipping will ever elicit from a slave. Only 
those who are not capitalists value the health and happiness of living labour 
as an end itself: though in the second phase even this distinction is blurred, 
for as human relations become a world, and take on the semblance of 
nature, work itself is confused with the specific form that it takes under 
capitalism, so that even those who fight for living labour fight against it, 
when they a) fight for ‘jobs for all’—more equitable wage slavery—or b) 
advocate the death of industry—a return to human subjection to 
‘mundane’—for Marx—considerations of daily survival, to the necessity that 
negates freedom. The first side cannot see that labour in its present form is 
inexorably damaging to human beings, and the second cannot see that they 
are caught up in the same misconception of the capitalists regarding 
technology and jobs, i.e., that ‘[a]ny other utilisation of the machinery than 
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the capitalist one is ... impossible’.49 For Marx, the trick is to use machinery, 
dead labour, in a manner that is good for human beings, a process that 
begins when human beings stop mistaking their own congealed activity for a 
natural world. Once this is done, once we begin to see the world differently, 
we will stop seeing the exploitation of human beings by their own past 
activity as being a natural way of ‘living’. Instead, we will see our own 
externalised relations as a set of conditions, made by us, but purely 
accidently—i.e., nobody ever knew that they were manufacturing a world—
in which we can begin to live, as human beings, as free individuals. As Marx 
writes:  
The alien and independent character in which it [human activity] exists vis-a-
vis individuals proves only that the latter are still engaged in the creation of the 
conditions of their social life, and that they have not yet begun, on the basis of 
these conditions, to live it.50 
If one objects to the idea that we are still in this phase, that the London 
of today and Dickensian London are worlds apart—or if one says that all 
exploitation now happens in ‘the third world’—one need only look at the 
commodification of ‘life’ at home, and the manner in which enjoyment and 
experience is something that we purchase. Marx’s statement, that the whole 
of the life of the worker is confiscated, could be said to apply to us more than 
to the folk in a Dickensian work-house: for at least in that context there was 
an end of the day at which one was booted into the cold night, to live or to 
die. Today, capital owns us around the clock, as we alternate between 
bleeding and drinking value—and, as Michel Foucault noted in a different 
context, the powers that rule us today would never be so wasteful as to let us 
die.51 As Marx complained in 1848, as today, the dead dominate the living, 
the past dominates the present, the machine dominates the worker.52 We 
consume the dead as the dead consume us, all of us having by now learned 
 
49 Marx, Capital, p. 569. 
50 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 162. 
51 Foucault, Michel, Society Must be Defended, USA: Picador, 1997, p. 241. 
52 Marx & Engels, The Communist Manifesto, pp. 61–62. 
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Nietzsche’s trick, to kiss as we bite.53 It is good to remember, at this time, 
that for Marx, there was still a phase beyond this one in which we live. It is 
still not too late to choose it. 
PART 4: THE FINAL METAMORPHOSIS: FREE INDIVIDUALITY 
There is little to say here that Marx does not say himself: ‘[f]ree 
individuality, based on the universal development of individuals and on their 
subordination of their communal, social productivity as their social wealth, is 
the third stage’.54 We can only say that it is clear that this free individuality 
cannot for Marx appear as a spontaneous development. There are three 
pertinent points here. Firstly, we much choose this phase. The cosmos is neither 
sentient nor benign, and history will not go anywhere good for 
us automatically. Secondly, we cannot simply become free ex nihilo: i.e., we 
have no ‘innate’ capacity or desire for freedom (to posit this is a failure of 
much Western/humanist Marxism). As awful as the condition described 
above is, for Marx it is necessary. The reduction of human beings to puppets 
and slaves of their own dead, ossified activity is an indispensable condition 
for creating the free individuality that Marx craves (on two counts, in that 1) 
capital’s abuse is not without some benefits for us, in that it forces us to 
become punctual and productive—as well as teaching us to want 
freedom55—and 2) in that for Marx, the idea of freedom without technology 
is nonsense, and capital’s hunger for our surplus-value has created 
technology that can support freedom).56 Finally, the only way to get from the 
second to the third phase is material: a change of the mode of labour is the 
impetus. After the experiments of ‘really existing socialism’, and considering 
how late in the day it is becoming, we should be forgiven for saying that all 
avenues of reaching free individuality should be pursued, material and 
‘superstructural’. Marx remains for me an excellent diagnostician of the 
 
53 Nietzsche, Friedrich, Beyond Good and Evil, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 62. 
54 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 158. 
55 Note the admixture of determination by forces and voluntary human action, i.e., external, ‘self’-
directed material change ‘advances’ to the point where human subjectivities can develop needs that 
cannot be fulfilled, motivating agents to internally-motivated action. This is the hallmark of the 
reading of Marx that Márkus subscribes to. 
56 Marx, Karl & Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology, USA: Prometheus Books, 1998, p. 61. 
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problems of our age. He is not so excellent regarding solutions. The last 
thing to note is that Marx returns to this idea of free individuality in Capital, 
in the first chapter, imagining his free, associated producers, using the means 
of production in such a manner that it is transformed from our master and 
the source of our misery and ignorance to our tool and the source of our 
many-sidedness and freedom.57 
CONCLUDING REMARKS: 
Many readings of Marx today fall into one of three traps. The first is to 
become too militant, following the orthodoxy in believing that communism 
is not a choice among many but rather a good-in-itself/inevitability. One 
can find and cite passages in which Marx himself speaks in this way, but on 
balance Marx believes that human beings (though the dead clutch at their 
brains) are ultimately in charge of human destiny. The second trap is to 
become too liberal, and to think that communism is simply a choice that we 
need to make (this is based in the illusion that we are presently free and 
making bad choices). Ending capitalism is not just a choice, and the matter is 
more complex than changing the way that people think (we are at war with 
our dead, who control to a large extent what we think, do, want and need, 
though we do not know it). The third trap of modern interpretation is to 
abandon the search for the ‘real’ Marx, as Althusser did in defence of Stalin 
(saying, effectively, that this reading is a distortion, but so are all readings), or 
as Reichelt did in stating effectively that Marx was distorted already before 
he was distorted.58 There is of course already excellent work in-between, 
various theses of continuity/reconstruction that show how Marx changes 
and how he stays the same,59 and works that deny the need to even think 
 
57 Marx, Capital, p. 171. 
58 The Neue Marx-Lektüre value-form reading of Marx is a paradox in a) its fidelity to Marx’s 
economic theory, and b) its lack of compunction in having little fidelity to his materialism. The concept 
of ‘real abstraction’ deserves the charge that Marx levels at the ‘economist who recognises exclusively 
either things or ideas’: vis, he cannot see relations, i.e., he cannot see that things are charged with a 
social substance that is activity made objective. To say that is value is a ‘a thing of thought’ is to miss 
what is unique, interesting, and obvious in Marx: value is congealed activity. 
59 Márkus, Marxism and anthropology; Silva, Nara, ‘Alienation Theory and Ideology in Dialogue’, 
Rethinking Marxism: A Journal of Economics, Culture & Society, 29/3, 2017. 
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about Marx in terms of being whole or split,60 reminding us that the 
argument only started because Marxists conflated idealism, liberalism, and 
the bourgeoisie, and thought that they had to disown anything that was not 
pure, clean, scientific materialism, even if that meant disowning Marx, or at 
least the dirty, Hegelian Marx who died in the 1840s and was reborn a 
messiah scientist.  
However, there is still scope for more discussions of Marx as a changing 
unity, that can help us on the left of Marxism, where some still think that our 
problem is rich people being greedy—a profoundly anti-Marxist thought—and 
on the other side of Marxism where areas even today still resist 
‘liberalisation’, forgiving bloodshed in the past and preparing for more in the 
present and future, stained by the old belief of Engels and Kautsky that 
communism was destined, and that no means are off limits if one is on the 
right side of history. The new ‘diagonal’ readings can founder too, in that 
they, tending towards seeing the subject position of human beings as always 
being subject(/interpellated), cannot relate to Marx’s angst over human beings 
being trammelled by external structures, or his desire to master them. The 
problem is not greed or apathy, and its solution no longer needs to be written 
in blood. Our problem (as a Marx not divided against itself can tell us) is that 
money qua capital rules the world. We all know this already, but that 
everybody ‘knows’ it conceals what it really means: that we are slaves to our 
own congealed activity. No longer to God—who is in Feuerbach’s influential 
understanding of alienation a freestanding edifice of displaced human 
emotion, an object that masquerades as a subject—but to the almighty dollar, 
which today contains our stolen life, personality, and power. 
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